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Abstract. Governments store primary commodities for redistributive reasons, or to deal with
missing risk markets. For either reason, interactions between public and private storage make it
difficult to compute an optimal storage policy: Any announced policy rule will induce equilibrium
private responses, in general, at each date; accounting for this makes searching for an optimal policy
prohibitively complex. Here, a method is developed that permits computation of the optimum in
a wide range of cases, by mapping the problem into a far simpler one, a form of dynamic program,
without loss of generality. Among the findings are that for a non-trivial portion of the parameter
space, the optimal policy pegs the price to a function of the current harvest alone; and that
commodity price stabilization/?^ .re is more attractive as a way of assisting producers, the less risk
averse the producers are.
*I am grateful to Alessandra Casella, Prajit Dutta, Ron Miller, and to seminar participants at
Columbia, Northwestern and Princeton for helpful comments. I alone am responsible for remaining
errors.
1. Buffer stocks: Introduction.
Public sector commodity storage policies, or buffer stocks, have a long history, as
international price management schemes,1 as national 'strategic reserves,'2 as instruments of
exporting-country monopoly power,3 and as food stocks kept as government farm policy or to
prevent consumption disruptions.4 The rationale for such policies varies; in most cases a transfer
motive appears to be important,5 but a risk-spreading motive, implicitly a response to presumed
Currently, natural rubber is the subject of an international buffer stock scheme, and the producer
country arrangement for coffee may be thought of as a.per se buffer stock policy in some respects.
Historically, tin, wheat, and cocoa have also been involved in such programs. In the 1970's,
UNCTAD attempted to create buffer stocks for several 'key' commodities as an instrument of
international development policy. See Gilbert (1987) and Finlayson and Zacher (1988) for surveys.
2US strategic reserves of petroleum and tin are examples. The latter still have a capacity of three
quarters of a billion barrels, and played a conspicuous role moderating price swings during the Gulf
War. See Blumstein and Komor (1996); Wright and Williams (1982) provide a theoretical analysis.
3See Krasner (1973) and Newbery (1984) for the case of coffee in Brazil, and Bardsley (1994)
for the case of wool in Australia.
4See Ravallion (1987) and Osmani (1991), for example, for discussions of the Bangladesh rice
buffer stock intended to prevent consumption shortfalls. See Ellis (1990, 1993) for the Indonesian
buffer stock system, which has a capacity of 3.5 million tonnes (Ellis, 1993, p. 106). Faruqee,
Coleman, and Scott (1997) discuss wheat price stabilization policies in Pakistan, which include an
important element of government storage. It should be emphasized that domestic buffer stocks for
this purpose can have a role even for a traded commodity, because transport costs allow for large
fluctuations in local prices apart from world prices. See Ravallion (1987) for extensive evidence.
5For example, US support for some international commodity programs in the 1960's was
explicitly a form of aid within the Alliance for Progress (see Finlayson and Zacher (1988)).
Naturally, this rationale implicitly assumes that lump-sum transfers are difficult or impossible,
which is often a reasonable assumption in this context.
2missing risk markets, is often discussed as well.6
If we grant some role for public sector storage, can we say anything about the optimal buffer
stock policy? In this paper it will be argued that the existing writing on this question has come short
of an answer, despite the rich literature on the welfare economics of buffer stocks.7 The key
difficulty is the interaction of the public storage policy with private storage. Since a fully optimal
policy would make use of public commitment to future storage policies, it would not only affect
welfare and prices directly, by the act of government storage; it would also affect expectations
within the market about future prices, thereby affecting the storage behaviour of private agents, and
thus affecting welfare and prices indirectly as well. This second class of effects, acting through the
expectations of private agents, makes the optimal policy problem an order of magnitude more
difficult than a conventional dynamic programming problem. In Section 3 it will be argued that
existing normative writing on buffer stock economics has in each case fallen short of identifying an
optimal policy, largely because this interaction has remained a formidable technical obstacle.
In this paper, a technique is developed that can, in a well-defined class of models, overcome
that obstacle. Under a series of assumptions developed in the text, it is shown that all buffer stock
policies can be mapped into a narrow class in which the government takes over all storage from the
private sector ('simple preemption policies'). Once this has been done, the problem reduces to a
modified version of a familiar dynamic programming problem. This makes the full optimum in the
6This is discussed extensively in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). Gardner (1987) finds some
evidence of an insurance motive in US farm policy.
highlights include Gustafson (1958), Massell (1969), Townsend (1977), Gardner (1979),
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Salant (1983), and Williams and Wright (1991). See section 3 for a
detailed discussion.
3presence of private storage computationally feasible for the first time. The problem in this form is
well-behaved in the sense that it exhibits a contraction mapping property, so that one can find the
optimal policy through familiar iterative techniques (although it is badly behaved in the sense that
there is no guarantee of a concave value function). Using these techniques, optimal policies are
exhibited for a variety of numerical examples. A key result is that commodity price stabilization
per se can at times be optimal, but it is much more likely to be attractive as a way of assisting the
producers of the commodity, the less risk averse they are. This contrasts sharply with conclusions
arrived at by some other authors, who have used a non-optimizing approach.
The approach pursued in this paper has a number of important limitations. It is based on a
model of private storage, involving risk-neutral, price-taking speculators with rational expectations,
which has a strong tradition in the literature8 but is not universally accepted empirically.9 It is not
clear to what extent the approach can be generalized to incorporate risk-averse speculators,
imperfect competition, or even non-constant marginal storage costs.10 Further, there is no role in
the model as here presented for futures markets, which have been extensively discussed elsewhere
as an alternative way of helping producers deal with risk.11 The goal here is to take the simplest
8This model is developed in Samuelson (1971), Salant (1983), Scheinkman and Schechtman
(1983), Wright and Williams (1988), and Deaton and Laroque (1992), for example.
example, Deaton and Laroque (1996) have questioned the consistency of the model with
price autocorrelation patterns in the data. See Williams and Wright (1991) for a survey.
10In the 'convenience yield' literature it is argued that sharply rising (negative) marginal storage
costs at low levels of storage are important empirically in some commodity markets. See Pindyck
(1994) for evidence.
"This is discussed at length by Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, ch. 13) and by Kletzer, Newbery and
Wright (1992), who also discuss a wide variety of other contractual solutions. It should be noted
that each of these offers a second-best outcome, leaving some room for buffer stock policies in
4canonical model of storage and show how a solution can be obtained there for storage policies
alone, with extensions to these other concerns left for the future.
Nonetheless, the calculation of a full optimum in this canonical model, taking full account
of the interaction with private storage, is a question of some interest, and the solution suggested here
appears to be new. In this light, the importance of this interaction to the buffer stock problem
should be underlined. Adnan (1972) emphasized the importance of speculators (whom he regarded
as a nuisance) in his experience as the manager of the buffer stock for tin. In discussing the 1974
famine in Bangladesh, Osmani (1991, pp. 329-31), and Ravallion (1987) emphasize the action of
speculators in frustrating the stabilizing goals of the rice buffer stock. Hallwood (1977) points out
that private storage in the commodities in question dwarfed even the ambitious buffer stocks
UNCTAD had proposed, and argued that failure to account for interactions between the two would
doom the proposed policies. The interaction has found dramatic expression in Salant's (1983)
theory of 'speculative attacks' on buffer stocks. As a result of the importance of private storage to
the analysis of public storage, any analysis of the latter that ignores the former would appear to be
seriously remiss.
The following section presents the canonical optimal buffer stock problem, shows that a
variety of important instances in practice can be seen as special cases, and shows why the
optimization problem is so difficult. Section 3 reviews some well-known attempts to analyze this
problem or a variant of it, and suggests that they all come short of solving the full optimization
problem. Section 4 shows how the problem can be mapped into a much simpler equivalent
problem. Section 5 discusses basic properties of the optimization problem, including the 'amnesia'
conjunction with these other instruments. See Lapan and Moschini (1996).
5property that follows when a solution is fully interior; and section 6 discusses some numerical
examples of optimal policies. Section 7 briefly comments on comparisons between the optimal
policies generated by this model and policies observed in practice.
2. The Problem.
Consider a market for a storable commodity with price-taking producers, consumers, and
speculators. Harvests at each date are an identically and independently distributed random variable,
and denoted by ht{\t would make no important difference if we had deterministic production but a
similar random shock to demand). Consumers have a downward-sloping demand curve P(Q), where
Q is the quantity they consume; its inverse isP~l. The realized price of the commodity at time t is
denoted/?,. Storage can be undertaken at any time either by the government or by speculators. Both
have the same technology. Beginning-of-period government inventories are /,(a state variable); end-
of-period government storage is g, (a choice variable). Beginning-of-period speculative stocks are
denoted by Jt. Storage incurs a constant marginal cost k and constant depreciation rate 3 in either
the public or private sector.
Government is able to commit fully and publicly to a policy, but in order to focus on the
optimal buffer stock problem, we will assume that the only instrument government has at its
disposal is storage.
Now, we make some assumptions about the preferences of the four classes of agents. First,
assume that all agents have time-separable, Von Neumann preferences and share a discount factor
p. Next, assume that this commodity is a small part of the consumers' budget sets (and there are
6no income or taste shocks), so that we can treat their marginal utility of income as constant and
focus on consumers' surplus as a measure of per period consumer utility.12 Further, assume that the
buffer stock operation is a sufficiently small portion of the government's budget, and the fiscal risks
sufficiently diversifiable, that we can treat the taxpayers' marginal utility of income as constant as
well, and focus on taxpayers' surplus as a measure of per period taxpayer utility. By contrast,
producers will be assumed to have a weakly concave Von-Neuman-Morgenstern utility function v,
to allow for producer risk aversion. Third, assume that producers cannot save or borrow. This is
a. per se unsatisfying assumption, maintained principally because it removes one level of complexity
from the problem. However, for certain crops and certain countries it may not be an outlandish
approximation; the question of binding liquidity constraints facing Third World farmers has
generated an enormous literature.13 It is worth mentioning that the assumption does not matter at
all in the event that farmers are risk neutral. Finally, as noted above, assume that the speculators
are all risk neutral.
These assumptions mean that the utility of the various agents can be represented for our
purposes as a function of the anticipated time path of the 'surplus' of the various agents, as follows:
Taxpayers: E E ; = 0 ^ f 5 J ; Consumers: E[£7=0^'GS,]; Speculators:
12This assumption can be relaxed very easily without changing materially the approach taken in
this paper. It is made here for simplicity and for consistency with the majority of the literature.
13See the symposium by Case et. al (1995) for a review. Further, it is possible that the presumed
lack of access by producers to financial markets is one of the market failures the buffer stock is
intended to address, in a second-best manner. It is likely to be possible to allow for endogenous
farmer saving behaviour through techniques similar to the techniques for dealing with private
storage in the text, but this is beyond the scope of the paper.
Producers: E^-oft1 v(PSZ],
where 'E' denotes expectations with respect to {ht}%0, and where:
CS, = U(Q) - Q P(Q) - J? P(q)dq - Q P(Q);
TSt=pfIrgt)-kgt; and
^i / ( l -^» - kJt+1l(\-S).
For simplicity, we assume away production costs and storage by producers, and thus treat producers'
income as simply the revenue received from sale of the crop. The quantity (I, - g,) is the
government's current net sale of the commodity. If this is positive, it is a source of revenue to the
government, which may provide tax relief elsewhere or additional public goods; if it is negative, it
is a current fiscal burden. Combining this with the government's storage cost kgt gives the full
fiscal effect, TSt, of the policy in period t. The speculators' surplus is similar; since by definition
of Jt, end-of-period-r storage must equal Jt+1 /(1 -5); the period-/ net sale of speculators is equal to
(Jt - Jt+I/(l-S)); and kJt+1l{\-5) is their current storage cost.
Next, we need an assumption about the preferences of the government. Assume that the
government is utilitarian, in the sense that it is not interested in anything beyond the well-being of
the four classes of agent; thus its objective function is a (weakly) increasing function of the utilities
of the four agents as just derived. Thus, within the class of policies from which it has to choose
(i.e., within the class of pure storage policies), its optimal choice will always be Pareto efficient.
8More specifically, assume that this objective function is a linear combination of these utilities. This
provides the problem with an enormously useful additional structure.
With all of these assumptions, the objective function can be written as:
aT\pt(It ~ a ) - feJ + as\pt(Jt - Jt+J{\-d)) - kJt+ll(l-S)\}l
An important state variable is total beginning-of-period stocks, St:
(1)
and there are two key laws of motion:
(2)
(3)
In general, the government may wish to condition its behaviour at a future date on the full
history that has elapsed up to that point. To allow for this possibility, we must define some history
variables. Define St = {SJ^ =0 a s the history of total stocks to date t, and similarly define /, and ht.
Then a buffer stock rule is a sequence of functions f = {yt}°°t = 0 giving government storage gt =
9yt(St, It, ht) as a function of the current state and history of the market.14 Allowing for the policy
to depend on the full history may at first glance appear to be excessive generality, but in fact it
merely reflects the fact that the rule is being chosen under full commitment.15 In committing itself
publicly to a certain pattern of action at a future date, say, t = 10, the government is directly
affecting outcomes at date 10, but also indirectly affecting outcomes at date 9 by affecting the
behaviour of speculators at that date. The type of influence the government may wish to have on
the speculators at date 9 may well depend on conditions at date 9; thus, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the government will wish to commit itself to different date 10 actions depending on
conditions at date 9. The same logic applies to periods 1 through 8, so in general they must be
included in the history variable as well.16 In addition to being required by the full commitment in
the problem, the dependence of the rule on the complete history has a huge benefit later on, because
it makes proof of the representation theorem of section 4, which simplifies the problem, enormously
simpler than it would be with some arbitrary truncation of the permissible history. Restricting the
generality of the rule at this point would make things much more difficult later.
There are two key constraints on government action. First, any buffer stock rule, to be
feasible, must satisfy the physical constraints:
14For the first period, assume that the government commits itself to y0 at the beginning of the
period, before it learns the realization of h0. This is simply a convenient timing convention.
15The analytics of the public sector storage problem under discretion are qualitatively different.
McLaren (1995) offers a simple example.
16This dependence of optimal policy on history is well-known in the dynamic public finance
literature. See, for example, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994).
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(4) 0<yj(St,It,ht)<St+ht.
The second constraint comes from the action of the market. The heart of the problem is the
interaction between the buffer stock rule and speculators. To capture this, for any buffer stock rule
F, we must seek an 'equilibrium:' a sequence of price functions W- { ,^}7 =o giy mg the price pt =
y/t{ St,It,ht)siSSL function of the current state and history. Such an equilibrium must satisfy the
market-clearing conditions:
pt ;> P(l-8)£-,+1/>,+ 1 - k;
(5)
pt = P(l-S)£ /+1/?,+1 - k whenever pt > P(St + ht - gt).
Here and throughout, 'E
 / +1 ' denotes an expectation with respect to the harvests at dates t + 1 and
later, conditional on all history to that point17 (even though in this equation only h
 t+ x is relevant).
The first condition in (5) says that speculators never make positive expected profits per unit stored;
if they did, their demand for the commodity would be infinite. The second condition says that if
speculators store a strictly positive amount, they must break even in expectation; otherwise they
would have chosen to store nothing. This can all be summarized in a Deaton and Laroque-type
(1992) functional equation as follows:
(6)
 ¥t( StJt,ht) = max{ P(St + ht- y , (S t , /„ ht)), p(l - S)Et+,[Wt+l(Sm,/,+1, h
t+l
I7It is convenient for this problem to think of h, as being realized at the 'end' of period /, with E ,
being evaluated at the 'beginning' of period t. Thus, 'Eo ' denotes an expectation with respect to all
harvests, from h0 on after.
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for all t > 0 and for all possible histories, where St+liIt+li and h, + L are derived from the period-/
values and the period-^ /1 +1) harvest by (1), (2), and (3). Any policy/price pair {FJF) satisfying the
physical constraints (4) and the market-clearing conditions (6) will be called 'feasible.'
Since the joint distribution of the time series TSt, CSt, PSt, and SSt is determined by f and
W, we can write the government's objective function compactly as W(F, ¥). The optimization
problem then becomes:
(7) Max
 {r. „ { W(r, <?)} subject to (4) and (6).
Some examples are as follows.
(i) The objective function could be:
E . C7 -oW'VS, + CS, + PS, + SSJ}],
or the expected discounted Marshallian surplus. It is well known that an optimum to this problem
involves setting y, = 0 for all t, and setting y/t equal to the unique stationary rational expectations
equilibrium price function under laissez faire.18 This is no mystery, since writing the maximand in
this way removes any risk-sharing motive (since it tacitly assumes away income effects) and any
distributional motive (since it weights all four agents equally). Thus, with no bias, missing market
18Gustafson (1958), Samuelson (1971), Scheinkman and Schechtman (1983), and Deaton and
Laroque (1992) deal with different aspects of this.
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motive or distortion, there is no need to tamper with the market.
(ii) By contrast, if producers are risk averse and identical and have no access to risk-sharing
markets, the objective function could look like this:
where v(-) is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function. This appears to be the simplest
representation for the canonical efficiency case for buffer stock policies, but a solution to this
optimization problem does not seem to be available in the existing literature,
(iii) Now, suppose that risk per se is not an issue, but the government in question has a
distributional bias. Then the objective function could look like:
E0[Y;t=0{pt[aTTSt + acCSt + aPPSt+ asSS,]}l
with at z 0. The weights at could represent either preferences of or political pressures on a single
government contemplating a buffer stock, or the relative bargaining strengths of various parties in
an international negotiation. For example, we could have aP> aT= aP = as, in which case the buffer
stock is really an indirect form of farm sector income support, or foreign aid with producers as the
beneficiaries. As mentioned above, this has at times been an explicit goal of storage schemes.
Alternatively, we could have ac> aT = aP = as, in which case the buffer stock is really aimed at
keeping consumers happy and is one interpretation of cereals buffer stocks administered in India
and Bangladesh. For a last example, we could have aT = aP>0 and ac = as = 0: a monopolist
13
exploiting its monopoly power through a buffer stock. Newbery (1984) solves a model of this sort
exactly, for a particular region of the parameter space, with Brazilian coffee policy in the first half
of the century as the chief example in mind.19
All of these problems can be represented in the form (7). It is now easy to see why these
problems are so difficult. Typically, none of the equilibrium price functions or optimal storage rules
will have closed form solutions; it is necessary to work on a computer with a particular example.
To evaluate the objective function for any given storage rule F requires two steps. First, a solution
to the functional equation (6) must be found, in order to get an equilibrium price function. This is
typically done through an iterative numerical procedure on the computer (Williams and Wright
(1988,1991) contain much detail on this). Then, with the F and ^functionsinhand, WiF^must
be evaluated. This is accomplished either through another iterative procedure or, more commonly,
by simulations of the random harvest. Once these two cumbersome numerical procedures have been
completed, one has a number for W{F,¥); it is then necessary to search for the F that gives the
highest value for this. Even the simplest, stationary storage policy is a function, and hence a high
dimension choice variable; even if it were quick to compute W(F,W) for each possible F, a search
for the optimum could take a long time; as it is, for each policy, fF(r,^) requires a considerable
computational undertaking. Finally, even if the search is ever successful and an approximate
optimum is obtained, there can be no pretense to have learned anything at all general, since the
result will be pinned down to a particular set of parameter values, functional forms, and a harvest
distribution.
19The trick he exploits is to find a parameter region for which (6) never binds.
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3. Previous attempts.
Within the commodities literature it is possible to identify three classes of papers that have
attempted to solve or at least say something useful about this problem.
(i) Attempts that assume away speculators.
A number of authors have analyzed optimal storage policy under the assumption that
government alone has the power to store. Examples of this are Gustafson (1958); Gardner (1979,
Ch. 3); and Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, Ch.30). This assumption eliminates the constraint (6) and
makes the price function y/{St, Itih,) = P(St + fy - %($, ^ , h,)). This has the benefit of making the
problem a conventional dynamic programming problem, but it seems difficult to defend because
it arbitrarily assigns powers to government that it denies to the private sector, and, as noted in the
introduction, flies in the face of all evidence.
(ii) Attempts that pay close attention to speculators, but focus on the welfare effects of a limited set
of policies.
Examples of this are Salant (1983); Gardner (1979, Ch. 5); Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, Ch.
29); Miranda and Helmberger (1988); and Wright and Williams (1988). This approach can provide
many insights and indeed has provided some of the most rewarding papers in the commodities
literature, but it does not bring us anywhere close to any statement about an optimum, or even the
15
qualitative features of an optimum.
(Hi) Attempts that use a static model to study the value of buffer stocks.
Massell (1969) presented a static model of a commodity market with random shocks to
supply and demand, in which the activity of a buffer stock was represented by the elimination of
price variability. The idea appears to be that a buffer stock would, over time, transfer the
commodity from states in which it is abundant to states in which it is scarce, thus removing
randomness from the price, but this can not clearly be represented in a model with no mtertemporal
dimension. Indeed, the mere physical feasibility of removing all price variability cannot be
investigated without an intertemporal model, as is shown in Townsend (1977) and other work.
Further, the model implicitly assigns to the government a function — commodity storage — that is
arbitrarily denied to the private sector. This paper inspired large amounts of work along the same
lines, comprising what is arguably a deeply misguided literature.
Several chapters of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), culminating in Ch. 20, follow a similar
path, in an innovative and influential attempt to evaluate the welfare effects of buffer stocks that
offers much that is interesting (including a careful treatment of welfare measurement under risk
aversion), but is subject to many of the same limitations as Massell (1969). These chapters
implicitly attempt to evaluate public storage policies by examining the welfare effects of exogenous
changes in the distribution of price in a static model with random shocks. There is no demonstration
that the given change in price distribution is feasible, in the sense of being possible to generate it
16
with a feasible public storage program.20 Further, as in the earlier work, welfare measurement is
purely static. It may be that the model is intended to represent the ergodic distribution of a dynamic
system; but to look at only the long-run distribution of utilities rather than to look at present values
would appear to require an assumption that discount rates are close to zero.
A key result from Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, Ch. 20) can be summarized as follows. In
their models, stabilization of the commodity price tends to result in a moderate negative effect on
farmer expected utility, composed of a large negative 'Transfer effect' (that is, change in expected
farmer income), and a small positive 'Risk effect' (that is, the effect on utility due to changes in risk
alone, or the total effect minus the 'Transfer effect'). Thus, commodity-price-stabilizing buffer
stocks are justified as ways to help farmers only if farmers have very high levels of risk aversion.
We will revisit this finding in section 6.
(iv) Attempts that use an arbitrary objective function.
A few papers avoid the difficulties of optimizing intertemporal welfare by specifying a
simplified, arbitrary ioss' function as the optimand. A particularly ambitious example is the
optimal storage computation of Ghosh, et. al. (1987), in which the objective function used is a
weighted sum each period of the squared deviations of price, buffer stock holdings, and buffer stock
net sales, respectively, from a target level (pp. 276-7). The difficulty with this is that it is not clear
why any government should ever measure welfare in that way, and since the objective function is
20Indeed, some of the calculations involve a hypothetical removal of all risk from the price
distribution, replacing the random price distribution with the mean of the price, again raising serious
questions of feasibility.
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not an aggregate of the agents' utilities, it is likely that there exist alternative buffer stock rules that
would be Pareto-superior to the rule to which the computations lead. Clearly, then, the sense in
which it is the 'optimal' buffer stock rule is in question.21
In summary, a large literature on commodities policy can be summarized as attempting to
analyze some version of problem (7), but because of the difficulties involved, each has omitted a
key piece of the problem, either (4) or (6), the welfare underpinnings of the problem, or its very
intertemporal nature.22 The most satisfying treatments of policy and its constraints have not
identified optimal policies. The reason for these problems is clearly the insurmountable technical
difficulty of finding an optimum in the full problem. In the next section, a method is outlined that
can produce optima without abandoning any of the problem's essential features, by mapping
problem (7) into an equivalent, but much more tractable, form.
4. The Key Assumptions and the Representation Theorem.
With the assumptions made to this point, it can be shown that the forbiddingly complicated
problem detailed above can be reduced to a relatively simple, manageable one. Specifically, we
21The authors make a bold attempt to incorporate a full treatment of forward-looking speculative
behaviour in the optimization problem. However, their formulation does not take advantage of
recursive methods to do this (see their equation (7.29)), so a large number of compromises are
forced on the authors to be able to arrive at a solution. For example, they are forced to impose a
finite horizon on the problem, with an arbitrary terminal condition, and to use a log-linearization
of the speculative price process that is troublesome, for several reasons that the authors
acknowledge (p. 38).
^Once again, the exception is Newbery (1984), who identifies conditions under which (6) does
not bind.
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show in turn that without loss of any generality we can: (i) Omit the government inventory history
from the list of arguments of the policy functions; (ii) simplify the objective function; (iii) focus on
policies that exclude private storage ('preemption policies'); (iv) summarize all history through the
previous period's price; (v) impose stationarity on the policy after period 0; (vi) restrict the state
space; and finally (vii) write the problem in the form of a modified Bellman equation.
(i) The public sector inventory history can be dropped from the argument list.
The first step is to note that without loss of generality, we can drop the //term from the state
vector on which the policy and price functions are conditioned. This is due to the following
argument. Suppose that we have in hand a policy/price pair (F,^) conditioned on all three state
histories as above. Then necessarily Ix = (l-S)yo(So, 0, h0), so we can write Ix (and thus, trivially,
Ii) as a function of SJ> and /%. Now, suppose that ^  can be written as a function of •$ _
 { and fy _ x, say,
f(St i,ht_ !>. Then It+l~{\ -3)yt (St,f(St _ b A, _ x), ht), and is thus a function of St and ht. Thus,
by induction, It can be written as a function of St _ x and ht _ x for all t. Thus, we may omit /, from
all lists of arguments without any loss of generality whatsoever.
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(ii) Simplifying the objective function.
Recall that the government's objective function can be written as:
aT[pt(It ~ gt) ~ kgt] + as\pt{Jt ~ Jt+A\S)) - kJt+ll(\-5)]}l
Now note that the last term can be rewritten:
~ (pt+k)/(\-S)}Jt+l\.
Consider the expectation zt =Bt+l [{ppt+1 - (p, + k)l(\-d)}Jt+ {] of the period-(r + 1 ) aggregate
speculative capital gains, conditional on all information up to the beginning of period (t + 1). (Thus,
it is conditional on Jt + { , for example, but not on ht+l .) Recalling (2), if Jt + t > 0, then
p, > P(St + ht- gt), so by market clearing condition (5), zt = 0. Thus, taking unconditional
expectations over the whole series, the total benefit to speculators becomes:
asE0\p0J0],
and we can write the objective function more simply as:
20
(8) Eo [ asPoJo + LT-o)?' {acVAQt) ~ QP(Q<)] + <*pv(pM + aT\pt(I, - gt) - kgt] }].
In other words, because in equilibrium speculators make zero profits, we can ignore any effect on
them after the first period, in which the announcement of the new policy will have the effect of
revaluing their initial stocks.
(Hi) Preemption policies.
Now, we make a major transformation to the problem. Consider a feasible policy/price pair
,W) and define a new pair by (r,^), where:
(9) yt(St9 ht) = St + ht- P-\vt{St, *,)) Vf, St, ht.
This is simply a new policy/price pair that leaves the price (and thus consumption, and thus total
storage) unchanged in each state after each history, but substitutes public sector storage for all
private storage. It can easily be verified that (?,if) satisfies (6) and is thus a feasible pair. Further,
since it leaves the price unchanged in each state, it leaves the first three sums in the objective
function (the as term, the ac term, and the aP term) unchanged.
Now note that the last sum in the objective function (8) can be written:
A
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The expression in braces is the government's net capital gain. Consider the expectation
E/+i [{fiPt+i ~ iPt + kyO--&)}gA of the period-(/ + 1) government capital gains, conditional on all
information up to the beginning of period (/ + 1). Recall (6). Either pt = P(St+ ht- gt), so that
yt(S,, ht) = St+ ht - P'\y/t(Sti ht)\ in which case, by (9), yt(St9 ht) = yt(St, ht\ andg, takes the
same value under the new policy as under the old policy; or/?, > P(St+ ht - gt\ so that yt{St, ht)
< S,+ ht - P~\if/t(S,, h,)), in which case p, + k= fi(\-S)E t+lp/+1> so expected government
capital gains are zero regardless of g,. In either case, replacing yt with yt has no effect on the
government's conditional expected capital gains. Thus, taking unconditional expectations over the
whole series, the objective function is unchanged.
Since the policy/price pair (r,W) is feasible and gives the same value to the objective function
as (F,1?), we can focus attention without loss of generality entirely on polices like rthat take over
all storage from the private sector (i.e., that satisfy (9)). We will call such policies preemption
policies, and they will be the focus of the remainder of the analysis. Notice that once we make that
decision, since the price function is defined in terms of the storage rule through (9), we can speak
in terms of choosing a storage policy F instead of choosing a policy/price pair.
The problem can now be represented as the maximization of (8) by choice of/"subject to
(4) and the constraint that the price functions derived from F through (9) together with F satisfy (6).
In other words:
Max E[ (as - aT)PoJ0 + £7=oy?' {ac[U(St+ ht -g,) - (St+ ht -gt)pt] + aPv(ptht)
+ aT\pt(St-gt)-kgt]}],
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through choice of r= {yt}~ = 0, where p,=P{St+ ht-gt\ SQ=J0,St+l = (l-5)g,, andg,= yt{ St, ht)
W, St,ht; and subject to the physical constraint (4) and:
(SC(0)
1 [P((l-S)yt(St, ht) + h- yt+l(St, (l-S)yt(St, ht\
for all /, St and ht. The constraints {SC(/)}7=oare t n e equivalent of the functional equation (6) in
the earlier form of the problem, and will be called the 'speculative constraints.' They ensure that
the speculators never strictly prefer to store.23
For convenience, write the objective function as:
E[ (as - aT)p0J0 + £ ; = o£' MS/, gt, k)}l
where
t,gl,kt) = ac[U(St+ht-gt)-(St+ht-gt)P(St+ht-gt)]
aPv(P(St+ hrgt)ht) + aT[P(St+ ht-gt)(St-gt) - kgt]
is the single-period return function for the government. In addition, write the maximized value of
23Note that the expectation in SC(Y) is taken with respect toh
 t+l. Thus, it is at the end of period
t that SC(Y) ensures that speculators do not strictly prefer to store.
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the objective function at date rasVr(ST, hx^ ),24 so that:
^o(So) = Eo[ (as - aT)PoSo + £7 = oy?'{n(St, gt, ht)}]; and
where the expectation is taken with respect to{ht}%T andFhas been chosen optimally.
(iv) Summarize history through previous price.
It turns out that most, but not all, of the history on which the policy and value functions are
conditioned can be dropped without loss of generality. To see this, first note that for any date r > 0,
the optimum must satisfy the truncated problem:
with respect to {yt}!=T •> subject to {SC(7)}r=o a n d the physical constraints (4), given S, and h,. For
t < r, neither S, nor ht enters the objective function of the truncated problem, nor affects the physical
constraints relevant to it. The only role that S
 r _ x and h T _ x can play in the truncated problem is in
the speculative constraints, and there only in SC(r-l). From SC(r-l), it is clear that the only
information from S
 T _ x and h r _ x that is relevant to the truncated problem is (S r _ t + h T _ t) and g T _ x
24Once again, note that this is evaluated at the beginning of period r, before /*rhas been realized,
consistent with the maintained timing convention. See footnote 14.
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= yx_ i(5T_ i, AT _!). Thus, the variables (Sx _ x + hr _ x) and gT _ 1 contain all of the pre-r information
relevant to the truncated problem.
Thus, without loss of generality, we can write the period-r storage function at the optimum
as a function of (S
 x, h x, (S x _ {+ h T _ x), g x _ ,) alone. Of course, that is equivalent to writing it as a
function of (S
 x, h T, (S T. j + h r . j)) alone, since 5 T= (1 -S) g r _ v Further, since p r- i =
P(Sr_ i+hr_! - St/(l-S)\ this is equivalent to writing it as a function of (ST,hT,p r _!) .
We could repeat the argument for any date r > 0, so that in general we may write our optimal
policy in the form yx(Sx,hT,pT_l\ and by extension, the value function in the form VT (S T, p T _ x).
It will be convenient to use 'p_{ to refer to the previous period's price in what follows. We will call
policies of this form, namely, preemption policies that are a function of the current state and the
previous period's price alone, simple preemption policies.
(v) Stationarity.
A focus on simple preemption policies allows us once again to simplify the speculative
constraint. We might call this final version the 'parsimonious speculative constraint.'
(PSC)
 A . , > fl(\-5)ErlP{Sx+ hx -yx(ST, hx,pt_,))] ~ K Vr > 0,pr_,.
Now suppose that f* = {y*ft=0 is an optimal simple preemption policy. Pick some r > 0, and define
an alternative policy, F**, as follows. For t ^ r, set y7=y*r For t > r, set y** = y*^. Thus, F** is
exactly the same as F*, except that at date r + 1, F** backs up one period to the period-r F * rule, and
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continues from there, permanently one period behind F*.
Now, because of the separability of the objective function across time, the choice {y*}%r
must maximize Er[ £7=r/?'~T {o(S,, g,/%)}] given £ , 4 , and/?T _ j subject to the law of motion, the
physical constraints, and (PSC) (possibly excepting some set of states of measure zero). But then
the same sequence of policy functions must maximize ET+,[ £7 =x+\Pf T {*{St, gt, ht)}] subject to
the same constraints (except possibly on some set of measure zero). The fact that each y* satisfies
(PSC) in/"* guarantees that they still will do so inF**. Thus, F** is a feasible policy and optimal.
By repetition of this argument we can replace F* with the policy: y0 = y*,; yt= y\ for t ^ 1.
(vi) Restricting the state space.
The infinite sequence of constraints imposes a number of restrictions on the domain of the
value function at each date. The focus on simple preemption policies allows us to summarize all
of these restrictions with a single inequality (denoted RES(°°) below), which is indispensable for
computation purposes. However, derivation of this inequality requires several steps. It is the last
technical hurdle before we can state the representation theorem that is the point of the paper.
First, for any point (S, /?_j) at which the value function for date r > 0 is defined, it is
necessary that the speculative constraint can be satisfied at that point, or in other words, the
following restriction must hold:
(RES(O)) p.x >fo(S) - fi(l-S)Eh[P(S+ h)] - k.
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Here and henceforth, 'E^' denotes an expectation with respect to a single realization, ft, of the iid
harvest. Condition RES(O) ensures that the speculative constraint would be satisfied if no storage
were conducted in the current period at all, which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
some storage rule that would satisfy it for the current period. Clearly,/0 is continuous and non-
increasing. Further, it is necessary that the speculative constraint be able to be satisfied with a
policy for the current period, say y(S, ft), that would ensure that RES(O) would be satisfied in the
following period as well.
(RES(l)) 3 y 3 © p . , > f}(\-d)Eh[P{S+ ft - y(S, ft)] - k.
(ii)P(S + ft - y(S, ft)) > fo((l-S)y(S, h)) Vft.
Fix S. For a given ft, there is a minimum storage level y(S, ft) at which (ii) is satisfied. This is either
the solution for g to:
P(S+ft-g)=fo((l-S)g)
if a solution exists, in which case it is unique; or it is y(S, ft) = 0. Call this policy function yF. Y(S, ft).
It is continuous and non-decreasing in S. Clearly, RES(l) holds for (S,/?-!) if and only if:
^ p(l-5)Eh{P(S+ft - yF;1(S, ft))] - k.
Clearly, fx is continuous and non-increasing. By repeated application of this logic, we see that
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(S>P-i)must satisfy the recursively defined sequence of restrictions:
(RES(«)) p., >fn(S) ^ ftl-SyEk[P(S+h - yF;n(S, ft))] - k,
for n = 1,...,°°, where y
 F. „ (S, ft) is the unique solution for g to P(S + h - g) —fH _ i((l-<5)g) if a
solution exists, and zero otherwise. We have thus defined an operator mapping each/,, function into
the subsequent fn + { function. It is straightforward to verify that this operator is a contraction
mapping,25 so that the/, functions converge uniformly to a limit, which we may denote fx, with the
corresponding minimal storage policy yF. „,. Noting also the monotonicity of the operator and the
fact that /(iS) >fo(S) \/S, the sequence offn(S) functions is an increasing sequence, so RES(«+1) is
always at least as restrictive as RES(«). Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for satisfaction
of all RES at once is:
A final note is that the functional operator relating subsequent/functions is essentially the
same as that defining equilibrium in the market with no government buffer stock (Deaton and
Laroque, 1992). Thus,/(jS) is the expected price in equilibrium under laissezfaire given that the
inherited stock is S, discounted to the previous period and net of storage costs. The previous price
must not exceed this. Denote the feasible set of states thus derived F:
25If we denote the implicit operator T, then it is clear that (i)J{S)>f(S) \/S implies that T[f](S)
z7lf](S)VS, and (ii)*:>0 implies that T\f+ K](S) i iy\(S) +P(l-S)tc. These are sufficient for the
contraction property by Blackwell's Lemma (Sargent, 1987, pp. 344-5).
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(vii) The Representation Theorem.
The above reasoning tells us that we can focus on simple preemption policies that are
stationary after the first period, say, a pair of rules (y^ y) for period 0 and subsequent periods,
respectively. All of this can be written compactly in the following form.
(Bl) *&/>_,) =
max?{E,W5, y(S, KP-,\ h) + M^MS, Kp.,\P{S+h- y(S, */>_,
for any (S,p^) e F, subject to:
h - y(S, kp.M ~ K
(iii) ((l-S)y(S, */>-i),P(S+K- y(S, Kp.x))) e
max ^  { (as - aT)P(S0 + h - yo(h))So + TT(S0, yo(h), h) + ^ ( l - % 0 ( ^ ) , ^ 0 + h -
subject to: (i) 0 < yo(h) < So+h \fh;
(ii
29
(Bl) is a Bellman equation that must be satisfied by the value function for period 1 and all
subsequent periods. The storage rule resulting from this equation, y, is then the storage rule for
periods 1 through infinity. (BO) is then a Bellman equation that gives the corresponding value and
policy function for the first period. A solution to these two equations is thus a globally optimal
policy under commitment. It can easily be checked that (Bl) satisfies the standard conditions for
a contraction mapping (such as described in Sargent (1987, pp. 344-5)), and thus has a unique
solution which can be reached by iterations on (Bl) from any starting point. It is, thus, from this
point of view, a very well-behaved optimization problem.
Of course, once we have computed the optimal preemption policy y, it is straightforward to
implement the same outcome through a variety of alternative policies that do not completely
preempt private storage. For example, we can define the optimal 'minimalist' policy ymm, where
for any (S, h,p_{) the value y""" (S, Kp_x) is defined as follows. Denote y (S, h,p_x) by g* and
P(S+h -g)byp\ Then if/ + k=p{\-5)ElP((\-d)g + h - %{\-&)g, fi,p ))], set y™ (S, h,p_,)
equal to zero; otherwise, set it equal to g*. It is immediate that the price process induced by y
continues to clear the market with policy y""" (in other words, (6) will be satisfied), and that the
value of the objective function is also unchanged, so that y """is optimal. The only difference is that
the minimalist policy allows private agents to do all of the storage when they are willing to do so,
and takes over from private agents only when they are unwilling to store. In each applied example
presented in Section 6, it will be useful to describe both the optimal preemption policy and the
optimal minimalist policy, in order to show the range of policies that implement the optimal
outcome.
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5. Basic Features of the Problem.
(i) Concavity and convexity.
After having written it in a manageable form, the first thing to note about this problem is that
there are important respects in which it is not necessarily at all well-behaved. Even if the demand
curve P is well-behaved and v is a standard, concave utility function, there is no guarantee that the
objective function is concave; and even if the objective function is concave, there is no reason to
expect that the value function will be concave. For example, if ac > 0 but aT = as-aP= 0, so that
consumer surplus is all that matters, the single-period marginal benefit of storage is equal to:
x8 = ac[S+h- g]P'(S+h - g) = acQP'(Q)<0.
Naturally, increased storage in any one year hurts consumers by driving the price up. However, this
marginal harm may easily be decreasing in g (so that the marginal benefit is rising in g). A
necessary and sufficient condition for this is:
-QP"IP'<\.
This will be satisfied if the demand curve is concave or not too convex. Thus, for example, if the
demand curve is linear and consumers are the main constituency for the buffer stock, the objective
function is globally convex in the main choice variable. It is easy to find examples in which the
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optimal policy that emerges is a policy of maximum instability: The government stores all it can
when the harvest is low, thus driving the price up as far as it can, and then releases all of its stocks
when the harvest is high, driving the price down as far as possible.26 The economic reason is that
the consumers get the commodity practically for free in the good years and do not mind waiting
through the lean years with no consumption to enjoy that. There is thus a large transfer of wealth
from the producers and taxpayers to the consumers. This is closely related to the point made by
Waugh (1944) that consumer surplus is a convex function of price, so that a mean-preserving spread
of price ceteris paribus benefits a risk neutral consumer.
The 'maximum instability' policy is unlikely to have any relevance in practice. The point
is that even a very simple, straightforward example can quickly turn pathological.
Even if the objective function is concave, there is no guarantee that the value function will
be as well. This is because the usual proof of a concave value function in dynamic programming
(see Theorem 9.8 of Stokey and Lucas (1989), p. 265) does not work. Consider two levels of
beginning-of-period total storage, S and S'. Storage of y(S, h, p _,) is optimal with S and y(S' ,h,p^
with S'. If the state is aS + (l-a)S\ a e (0, 1), there is no guarantee that storage of
ay(S, h,p^) + (l-a)y(Sr, h,p_^ will be feasible; it will be physically feasible, but might violate the
speculative constraint. This invalidates the usual proof of concavity of the value function, and does
not leave available any obvious replacement. The result is that one should be more careful than
usual in checking for optima that are local but not global, and for corner solutions, in these
26For example, suppose that the harvest follows a two-point distribution, with a harvest H with
probability p each period and a harvest L with probability (1 -p), H > L. Then, with a linear demand
curve, it is not hard to show that the policy described is optimal ifH/L and k are large enough.
Naturally, if k is low, speculators will greatly restrict the scope for such a policy.
32
problems.
(ii) Fully interior optima: The 'amnesia' theorem.
Suppose that under the optimal policy, neither the physical nor speculative constraints ever
binds (at any date, or at any state of nature). Call such a policy a 'fully interior' solution. Then a
feasible perturbation of the optimal policy would be to store slightly more at time r > 0 and then
preserve that additional amount of the commodity permanently in the silo, allowing it to depreciate
naturally over the years. This would change the value of the time-r return function by iz% and the
value of the return function for subsequent periods r + n by (1 -5) n[ns+ n J = -a-^l-d) "k. In order
for these to balance, it is necessary that:
7tg(Sr, gr, hT) = aTkl{\-p{\-5)) Vr > 0,
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. Recalling the expression for zr, this can be written
as:
- aTP(S + h-g)-aTk- [ar(S - g) - ac(S + h - g) + aPhv'(P(S + h- g)h)]P'(S + h - g)
(10) = -aTp - aTk - [ar(Pl(p)-h) - acPl(p) + aPhv'(ph)]P'(Pl(p))
where p = P(S+h-g) is the price.
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Equation (10) defines a simple relationship between the current harvest, h, and the current
price,/?, that must be satisfied at all times after period 0 by a fully interior optimum. There are two
useful observations to make about that. The first is that if the function ?rgis at all well behaved, this
will implicitly define the current price as a function of the current harvest alone. This is a very
strong result indeed, since in general the optimal policy depends on the past in two ways: Indirectly,
through accumulated inventories; and directly, through the previous period's price. In the case of
a fully interior solution, the price will not depend on either, and in light of this independence from
the past we might call such a policy an amnesiac price peg.21
The second observation is that in the event of a fully interior solution, because of (10) the
policy will generally be very easy to compute. In some cases, one will be able to calculate a full
solution by hand; one such example is given in the next section. Even if we are not interested in
fully interior solutions in and of themselves (and indeed, they are unlikely to be empirically
important), they can help considerably in shedding some light on the parts of the parameter space
for which the constraints do bind. This is because it can help map the parameter space. The
statement that an optimum is fully interior is a statement that the three inequalities (i) and (ii) in
(Bl) hold strictly at each state. This assumption leads to (10), and a simple, easily computed policy
rule. If we write down that policy rule in terms of the underlying parameters, inequalities (i) and
(ii) then become conditions on those parameters, and in principle we can use those conditions to
map out the region of the parameter space for which the optimum is fully interior. Each boundary
of this region represents one of the three constraints for some level of the harvest; when the
27Naturally, in the case of an amnesiac price peg, there is no difference between the optimal
preemption policy and the optimal minimalist policy. Both will have zero private inventories.
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parameter values cross such a boundary, we move from a regime in which none of the constraints
ever binds into a regime in which one of the constraints binds. Thus, examining the fully interior
solution can give some insight into how features of the optimal policy are affected by changes of
various directions in the parameter values. This strategy is illustrated in the next section for a
simple linear-quadratic example.
6. A linear-quadratic example.
Consider the following model. The demand curve is given by P(Q) = a- bQ. There are two
possible values for the harvest, H and L, with H> L. The harvests are iid, with probability/? of a
high harvest each period. In such a market, in the absence of policy, competitive speculators follow
a linear storage rule when h = H and sell everything when h = L, with prices always higher in the
latter state than the former one (at least if a particular inequality on parameter values is satisfied:
see Newbery (1984)).
The producers' utility function is given by U(y) — cy - dy 2/2. Consumers and taxpayers are
assumed to have equal weight in the government's objective function, so without loss of generality
we can normalize so that ac = aT = aP = 1. Thus, the single-period return function is:
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b(St + ht-gt )2/2 (Consumer surplus.)
+ c[a - b(St +ht- gt)]ht - d{[a - b(St + ht - gt)]ht}2/2 (Producer utility.)
+ [[a - b(St +ht- gt)](St- g,) - kg,]. (Taxpayer surplus.)
Example 1: An Amnesiac price peg. First, look for parameter values for which amnesiac
price pegs are optimal. Figure 1 shows how the solution changes as we move through (c, d) space
when the other parameter values are: a = 100; b = 1; H =60; L = 20; p = 0.75; S = 0.1; ft = 0.97;
k = 1. A movement northeast along a ray through the origin represents a rise in the weight attached
to producers without changing the preferences of those producers. By contrast, a movement through
the picture that places us on a lower ray represents a rise in producer risk aversion.
The solution to (10) is given by the following equation, in which Qh denotes consumption
in the event of a harvest of size h.
(11)
cbh - a - d(a -bh)bhz -2 k
Q,(c,d) = h - J £!—
* (db2h2
 + b)
This implies a storage rule through the identity y(S, h) = (S+ h - Qh). We can then define
ph= a - bQh for h = L,H. For example, when c — 9 andd=0.002,pH = 57.576 andpL = 84.514.
Call this case Example 1; it is represented by a small circle in Figure 1. The shaded area in the
figure is the region in which 0 < Qh < S + h permanently if the storage rule implied by (11) is
followed; in other words, this is the region in which the amnesiac price peg satisfies the physical
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constraints. The curves LL and HH give the locus of points on which the amnesiac price peg just
satisfies the speculative constraints in the low harvest and the high harvest respectively. Points
above and to the right of LL satisfy the constraint strictly for h = L, and points below and to the left
of HH for h = H28 Thus, the shaded region of the parameter space between HH and LL is the region
within which the amnesiac price peg defined by (11) is feasible; and so (since this policy is the
unconstrained optimum for the given objective function) this is the region for which it is the optimal
policy.
The curve TT gives the points within this region for which pH =pL: the locus of total price
stabilization. To the right of this curve, prices are stabilized only partially, in the sense that/?
 H<pL,
but the prices are brought close enough together that speculators do not care to store (whereas in the
absence of the policy, speculators would always store when h = H; again, see Newbery 1984)). To
the left of TT, prices are over-stabilized in the sense thatpH>pL, a reversal of the natural pattern.
Notice that as the producers become more risk averse, that is, as we move to the right within
the shaded area of the diagram, price stabilization becomes less and less attractive. It is only when
farmers care little about risk, that is, in the left-most section of the shaded region, that commodity
price stabilization (CPS) becomes optimal (in the sense that raising/?# more than/?L can be called
CPS). This is the opposite of the conclusion of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, Ch. 20), who argued
that CPS would likely make farmers poorer in expected value but reduce their risk, and thus be
28Strictly speaking, points where (11) satisfies the speculative constraint in the H state are points
below the ////curve in the upper right-hand corner of the Figure, and above the curve marked '£T
in the lower left-hand corner. The relevant inequality gives an expression for a threshold value of
c as a function of d whose denominator changes sign at a critical value of d. Similarly, the points
satisfying the speculative constraint in the L state are found above the LL curve, and below the L
curve in the lower left-hand corner. Clearly, the lower curves generate no additional points
satisfying all of the constraints, and can be ignored.
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attractive to farmers only if they were extremely risk averse. The reason this result comes about is
that here we are looking at optimal policies, which means minimizing the cost to consumers and
taxpayers for a given level of producer benefit. Now, the marginal fiscal cost of a rise in
government purchases isp - ( g - S )P' + k /(I - /?(l-<5)); the marginal reduction in consumer
surplus is -QhP' = -(S + h - g)Pf. The sum of these is the total marginal cost of government
purchases,/? - hP' + kl{\ - J3(l-S)). The marginal increase in farmers' income is-hP', and so the




For a given price level, this is smallest when h is high. In other words, ceteris paribus, the most
efficient time to transfer income to the farmers is when the harvest is high, because then the base
to which the price rise is applied (that is, h) is large relative to the distortion caused. However, a
policy of raising price more aggressively when h is high than when it is low also raises the variance
of the farmers' income. Thus, it would be attractive to use such a policy only if the farmers' utility
function is not too concave. Thus, if we are principally trying to help out the producers, CPS is least
attractive when they are quite risk averse. That fact that Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) focussed on
arbitrary changes in the distribution of price, rather than on optimal storage policies,29 accounts for
the absence of this cost-minimizing reasoning in their analysis.
29As noted above, optimal storage is analyzed in their Chapter 30, but for a very different
problem. The object there is to analyze the optimal public sector storage policy given that the
private sector is exogenously assumed not to store.
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Two more examples, outside of the 'amnesiac' region of the parameter space, are
summarized in the subsequent diagrams.30 Both retain the same values as above for all parameters
except for c and d. In the case illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, c = 2 and d = 0. Call this Example 2.
It also is marked as a small circle on Figure 1. Example 2 represents the case of a pure transfer;
since all agents are risk-neutral, insurance is not an issue, but farmers have twice the welfare weight
given to anyone else. Figure 2 shows the price as a function of S andpA under the optimal policy
for Example 2, and Figure 3 shows a simulation of 200 periods of history under the optimal policy,
with inventory carryin S on the left axis and the current price p on the right. Figures 4 and 5 show
the same exercise for a third case, Example 3, for which c = 2 and d = 0.001. This can be thought
of loosely as a case of a policy with a 'pure insurance' motive; the objective function does not
uniformly favor the farmers over other agents because for some levels of farmer income the
weighted marginal utility of farmers is below that of other agents.31 Thus, there is no clear transfer
motive for policy, but the risk aversion of farmers does indicate a clear insurance motive. In
Figures 2 and 4, the price at each state value is plotted on the vertical axis; for state values near the
origin, which lie outside of F (and thus are infeasible and irrelevant, as noted in Section 4(vi)), the
price is arbitrarily set equal to zero. To facilitate comparison with Example 1, in Figures 2 and 4,
the prices 57.576 and 84.514 of the optimal peg in that Example are marked where appropriate. The
realized harvest series in Figure 3 is exactly the same as the one in Figure 5.
30These optimal policies were generated by recursions on the modified Bellman equation (Bl),
using a sixth-order polynomial in S and/?.! to approximate the value and policy functions. The
Gauss program is available from the author on request.
31Strictly speaking, Example 3 departs slightly from the linear-quadratic functional form, since
for the computations farmer utility was specified to be constant after the bliss pointy = eld. This
was to avoid negative marginal utility.
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Example 2: Pure transfer motive; Preemption policy. Under the optimal policy in Example
2, note that for most of the state space, the price tends to be lower during a period of drought (Figure
2b) than in a period with a normal harvest (Figure 2a). This is explained by the cost-minimizing
reasoning noted above: With the farmers risk-neutral, the most efficient form of transfer to them
involves a price that is highest when the harvest is large. The behaviour this implies for the market
over time is indicated in the simulation of Figure 3. In intervals of sustained good harvest, such as
occurred in this simulation, for instance, during periods 69 to 81, the government supports the price
aggressively, steadily accumulating stocks, and the price gradually descends to a floor of about 59.
If, then, a low harvest occurs, as did here in period 82, the government takes advantage of that event
to unburden itself of a large fraction of these stocks, providing a respite to both taxpayers and
consumers at a time when the harm this will cause to producers is minimal. Accordingly, this
drought is accompanied by a sharp drop in the price, to a value of 39. For the same reason, all of
the lowest prices recorded in this simulation (all clustered around a value of 40) occur in drought
periods.
On the other hand, when a fairly sustained drought occurs, as it does in periods 57 to 59, the
government quickly depletes its inventories and the price rises very rapidly to a value of P(L) =
P(20) = 80. For this reason, the highest prices in the simulation, the spikes with values rising
through the high 70's, also occur in drought periods. Thus, the range of drought prices observed in
equilibrium is much greater than the range observed in normal periods, as one might have guessed
from a glance at Figure 2.
Example 2: Pure transfer motive; Minimalist policy. Under the optimal policy described
above, the speculative constraint binds in the first period or two of a drought, and at no other times.
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Accordingly, the optimal minimalist policy can approximately be described as follows. The
government aggressively supports the price during periods of good harvest, with a long-run target
price of around 59, and a somewhat higher target price if inventories are low.32 In these normal
times, there will be no speculative storage. However, when a drought occurs, the government
dumps all of its stocks on the market. Speculators purchase some of these released stocks, and if
the next period is normal they sell them all, as government purchases resume. If, instead, the
drought continues, speculators hold onto some portion of the stocks for one more period and then
sell them all. In short, (in this example with a pure transfer motive) the government monopolizes
storage in normal times, but in droughts it relies on the market.
Example 3: Pure insurance motive; Preemption policy. By contrast, under the optimal
policy in Example 3, the price tends to be higher during a period of drought (Figure 4b) than in a
period with a normal harvest (Figure 4a). Essentially, the government pulls the price up a bit during
a drought, when farmers' marginal utility is high, and pushes it down a bit when there is a normal
harvest, when the farmers' marginal utility is low. For this reason, the speculative constraint binds
during normal years, and not during droughts. The government would like to release all of its stocks
when there is a large harvest, but it cannot because at that point speculators would wish to store.
Figure 5 shows that, with the government showing no favoritism to farmers in this case, the
inventories it holds are very small, and the price is driven mainly by the value of the current harvest.
Example 3: Pure insurance motive; Minimalist policy. The foregoing discussion indicates
32In interpreting Figure 2 for this purpose, it is useful to confine attention to the portion of the
state space within which the system stays during the simulation, namely, the rectangle for which S
e [0, 150] and/?_! e [39, 85]. Within that range, the current price is affected much more by the
current level of inventory than by the previous price.
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that the optimal minimalist policy for Example 3 can be described as a policy of non-intervention
and no government stocks in a normal period, and a mild price support policy during droughts. Note
that the price during a drought is often slightly above 80, indicating positive accumulation to reduce
the hardship of the farmers, despite the scarcity of the good in those periods. Thus, in the insurance
case the behaviour of government is the opposite of what it was in the transfer case: It supports the
price during a drought, and lets the market work in normal times.
These three examples are of course only a sampling, but it is hoped that they may indicate
the potential usefulness of this approach and the range of government behaviours that may be
optimal in different settings.
7. Concluding remark on the interpretation of observed policies.
A final word may be in order on the comparison of theoretical optimal buffer stocks with
actual policies. The optimal policies discussed here have been expressed as a function of the current
level of inventory, the current harvest, and a recent price. In practice, most primary commodity
policies have had rules expressed as a function of none of these, but of current price (see Gilbert
(1987) for several examples). This is not, however, necessarily a meaningful difference. Without
making any sort of claim that any existing policy is optimal, it is nonetheless worth pointing out that
these differences in and of themselves do not rule that possibility out.
First, the fact that most policy rules are conditioned on price rather than quantities is not
necessarily germane. In many cases it will be possible to achieve the same outcome with a policy
conditioned on quantities as with one conditioned on prices. For example, the price-peg policy
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studied by Salant (1983) is a rule giving the behaviour of the buffer stock manager conditional on
the current price; however, Salant shows that the equilibrium price in that model is a function of
total availability alone, which in notation used here is given by St+ ht. Thus, total storage can also
be written as a function of total availability, and we can easily write a buffer stock rule, y(St+ ht\
that delivers exactly the same outcome. Thus, the distinction between price-based and quantity-
based rules is spurious.
Second, actual commodity storage rules in practice do not seem to condition on the current
harvest per se (I cannot name an example that explicitly does so). However, in the model of this
paper, that is not necessarily inconsistent with optimality. For intermediate parameter values (such
as along curve TT of Figure 1), the 'efficient transfer' motive discussed in section 6 balances against
farmer risk aversion, and price is independent of the current harvest per se. In an empirical
example, it is conceivable that the optimum could be a function of h but depend on it in a weak
manner (because the parameters are near TT), and that in order to simplify, the framers of a buffer
stock rule would simply drop the harvest term. However, if that is the correct interpretation, it does
suggest that the parameter values must indeed be intermediate: Thus, it would imply that a
substantial risk-sharing motive has been built into these policies in the past, and that a claim that
they satisfy a pure transfer motive would be untenable.
Finally, in the same spirit, it should be clear that an actual dependence on/? ^ is not necessary
for an optimum, and, as section 4(iv) made clear, even if the optimum does depend on some element
of the past, there are several equivalent sets of conditioning variables. In this case, there actually
are empirical precedents; buffer stock rules often have trigger-price adjustment rules that depend
on the recent history of the scheme. The cocoa buffer stock rules required adjustment of the target
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price range in case of buffer stock purchases or sales above a specified level over a 12 month period.
The rubber buffer stock had a similar rule, and one for adjustment if the average price was outside
of the target range over a 6 month period (Ghosh, et al (1987, pp. 178-9)). Both of these are an
explicit dependence of the buffer stock rule on some element of the recent past.
One question that is not easy to answer is, given that the 'price band' form for buffer stock
rules has been the most popular, is there a situation in which that can be generated as an optimum
within this model? What this would mean is a combination of demand curve, producer utility
function, distribution for h, and welfare weights, such that the optimal preemption policy could be
written as y(S + h), with 0 < y' <, 1 and with two intervals over which y' — 1. (This observation is
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Figure 2a. Example 2: Pricing behaviour in H-state.
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Figure 4b. Example 3: Pricing behaviour in L-state.
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